I compare rates of intergenerational occupational mobility across four countries in the late 19th century: (1) 1869-1895 Argentina, (2) 1850-1880 United States, (3) 1851-1881 Britain, and (4) 1865-1900 Norway. There was a sharp divide between areas of recent European settlement and Europe in terms of social mobility: Argentina and the US had similar levels of intergenerational mobility, and these levels were above those of Britain and Norway. These findings suggest that the high levels of mobility in 19th-century US were not a reflection of "American exceptionalism", but rather a more general phenomenon of some recently settled economies.
Throughout the 19th century, several observers pointed to the "exceptional" social mobility experienced by the US population. For instance, when comparing the social class structures in the US and Europe, Marx (1852) argued that in the US social classes "have not yet become fixed but continually change and interchange their elements in constant flux." 1 Recent research indeed shows that the US exhibited higher intergenerational occupational mobility than Britain in the second half of the 19th-century (Long and Ferrie, 2013) .
In this paper, I ask whether the high levels of mobility of the US relative to Britain were a reflection of American exceptionalism or, rather, a reflection of more widespread differences between areas of recent European settlement and the Old World. To do so, I compare rates of intergenerational occupational mobility across four countries in the late 19th-century: (1) 1869-1895 Argentina, (2) 1850-1880 United States, (3) 1851-1881 Britain, and (4) 1865-1900 Norway.
The US-Argentina comparison is of special interest. Both countries shared many of the characteristics that have been suggested as explanations for the high mobility levels in 19th-century US: both were areas of recent European settlement, with sparse (compared to other countries in the Americas) indigenous populations and large areas of unexploited land (the "frontier"). Both countries also attracted large numbers of European immigrants and experienced a period of rapid population and urban growth during the second half of the 19th century. The contrast with Norway is also revealing since, unlike Britain, Norway had a similar occupational structure -characterized by a large fraction of workers in the primary sector-to Argentina and the US in the mid-19th century.
To conduct the analysis, I combine data of my own construction linking fathers and sons across the 1869 and 1895 censuses of Argentina, with similarly constructed data from the US, Britain and Norway. 2 In these datasets, I observe an individual's occupation in adulthood, as well the occupation held by his father when the individual was a child. I use these data to analyze the extent to which a father's occupation provided his sons with an advantage in accessing a given occupation in adulthood.
I find that Argentina and the US had similar levels of intergenerational occupational mobility, and that these levels were above those of Britain and Norway. The evidence suggests a divide between the areas of recent European settlement and Europe in terms of late 19th-century mobility.
These findings suggest that the high levels of mobility in 19th-century US might not have been a reflection of "American exceptionalism", but rather a more general phenomenon in some "settler economies" of the New World.
Extending the comparison beyond two countries enables me to make progress on the question of why mobility levels might have been higher in Argentina and the US. I show that the difference between Argentina and the US and Europe was not driven by each group of countries being at a different stage of the industrialization process at the time. When comparing Argentina and the US to Norway, a country that (unlike Britain) still had a large fraction of its population employed in farming in the mid 19th-century, the results still indicate higher levels of mobility in the former countries. Indeed, despite having a very different occupational structure, Britain and Norway looked similar to each other in terms of mobility. I also show that differences in the fraction of immigrants in the population, the quality of public schooling, or fertility patterns were unlikely to be the main reason for the differences in mobility.
Instead, I argue that the most likely explanation for the mobility differences is related to two common characteristics of Argentina and the US in the second half of the 19th century. First, both Argentina and the US featured much faster population growth than Britain and Norway.
This population growth resulted in the creation and expansion of cities and towns, and provided opportunities for occupational mobility that were unavailable in the slower-growing economies of Europe. Second, both Argentina and the US were land-abundant economies. This abundance of unexploited land -the "frontier"-made the transition into independent farming easier than in Europe. 3 This explanation is also consistent with the fact that rates of intergenerational mobility appeared to have converged to those in the European countries during the 20th century (Long and Ferrie, 2007; Modalsli, 2017) , after population growth and frontier expansion had slowed down.
One concern when using linked data to compare rates of intergenerational mobility across different countries is that the selection into the sample or the prevalence of incorrect matches might have differed across countries. In the context of this paper, if rates of false matches were higher in Argentina and the US than in Britain and Norway, I would mechanically find higher rates of mobility in the former two countries. To address this concern, I show that the results are similar when using a more conservatively linked sample only for Argentina and the US, thus biasing the samples against the main finding of the paper -that is, that mobility was higher in Argentina and the US than in Britain and Norway. I also show that, to rationalize the observed differences in mobility between the countries, the rates of incorrect matches in the Argentine and US data would have needed to be implausibly higher than the corresponding rates for Britain and Norway.
I emphasize that these results pertain to occupational mobility, as measuring income mobility is not feasible for any of these countries in this period. The study of occupational mobility has a long tradition in sociology (see, for instance Jonsson et al. (2011) ), and has recently attracted attention in economics (Long and Ferrie, 2013) . The extent to which occupation-based measures of mobility agree with income-based measures of mobility is an empirical question. Recent work comparing contemporary levels of intergenerational mobility in the US to those in the early 20th-century (Feigenbaum, 2017 ) finds a similar pattern (higher mobility in the past than in the contemporary period) regardless of the use of occupation-based or income-based mobility measures. This paper is more closely related to the research comparing levels of intergenerational mobility over the long run. Examples in this literature include Long and Ferrie (2013) , Modalsli (2017) , Olivetti and Paserman (2015) and Feigenbaum (2017) . Unlike my paper, these studies focus exclusively on Europe and the US. 4
More broadly, the evidence on historical social mobility for contemporary developing countries is limited. 5 Given the limited number of studies on historical mobility in the developing world, comparative evidence including developing countries is even rarer. One exception is Clark (2014), which uses the status information contained in surnames to characterize social mobility for several countries and time periods, including Chile, China and India. 6 4 There is also a large literature on contemporary levels of intergenerational mobility, both within particular countries and in a comparative perspective. Examples in this literature include Chetty et al. (2014a ), Chetty et al. (2014b and Solon (2002) , among others.
5 Two exceptions are Cilliers, Fourie et al. (2016) and Chen, Naidu, Yu, and Yuchtman (2015) . Cilliers, Fourie et al. (2016) studies intergenerational mobility in 19th-century South Africa. Chen et al. (2015) study mobility in educational attainment in China over the 20th-century.
6 The author finds high and similar levels of persistence in social status across countries and periods. There are a number of potential reasons why the results in Clark (2014) differ from mine. First, my results pertain to mobility across two generations, while Clark measures mobility over the course of several generations. Second, while I measure mobility across families (or more precisely, across father-son pairs), Clark measures the persistence of elite status across surname groups.
I Data
I combined four father-son linked data sets for the second half of the 19th-century. First, I constructed a sample following males through the 1869 and 1895 Argentine censuses of population.
In these data, I observe children who resided with their father in 1869, and I then link them to their labor market outcomes in adulthood in the 1895 census. I provide further details on the construction of this sample in Pérez (2017) .
I then combined these data with three existing linked datasets corresponding to the US, Britain and Norway. For the US and Norway, I used the samples constructed by IPUMS through the North Atlantic Population Project (Ruggles et al., 2011) . The US linked sample was constructed by linking the 1850 and 1880 US censuses, while the Norwegian sample was constructed by linking the 1865 and 1900 Norwegian censuses. For Britain, I used the sample constructed by Long and Ferrie (2013) , who linked males across the 1851 and 1881 British censuses. In the online appendix, I provide details on the linking algorithm used in the construction of each of these samples. 7
These samples share a number of important similarities, which facilitates the comparison across countries. First, each of the samples was constructed by linking national censuses of population.
Hence, all of the samples include individuals from a diverse set of areas within each of the countries.
Second, the linking process was based on information on names, place of birth and year of birth.
This identifying information is non-unique and prone to enumeration and transcription errors. If the prevalence of errors or the selection into the sample differed across countries, it would be hard to disentangle true differences in mobility from differences in sample construction, a possibility I discuss in section II. Third, the samples are limited to father-son pairs in which the son coresided with his father at the time of the initial census. This restriction biases all of the samples towards intact households in the initial census year.
To improve the comparability of the data, I imposed two additional sample restrictions. First, I only included sons who were 16 years old or less when observed living with their father. This adjustment corrects for the fact that individuals who coreside with their father until relatively late might exhibit different patterns of mobility than those who do not (Xie and Killewald, 2013) .
Second, I restricted the sample to father-son pairs in which both the father and the son were 7 The results (not reported) are similar if I use instead the US sample constructed by Long and Ferrie (2013) , and/or the Norwegian sample constructed by Modalsli (2017) .
between the ages of 30 and 60 when their occupations were measured. This adjustment deals with the fact that occupations measured either too early or too late in the life cycle might be a noisy measure of economic status. I emphasize, however, that these restrictions do not affect any of the conclusions of the paper. The final samples include about 12,000 father-son pairs for Argentina, 1,500 for the US, 3,000 for Britain and 13,000 for Norway.
Self-reported occupation is the only economic outcome that is consistently available across all of the datasets. I classified occupations into four broad categories using the HISCLASS (Leeuwen et al., 2002) classification: white-collar, farmer, skilled-semi skilled and unskilled. To do so, I first assigned each occupation a code from the Historical International Classification of Occupations (HISCO). I then mapped each HISCO code to an occupational category using HISCLASS. 8 In section II, I show that the results are similar when using less coarse occupational categories. The simplest measure of mobility is the fraction of sons in a different occupational category than their father, reported in panel (a) of table 2. About 55% of the sons in the Argentine sample worked in a different occupational group than their father, compared to 47% in the US, 43% in Britain and 42% in Norway. This simple metric suggests higher levels of mobility in Argentina than in every other country included in the comparison. In addition, it suggests higher mobility in Argentina and the US than in Britain and Norway.
II Intergenerational Mobility Across Three Continents
As discussed in Long and Ferrie (2013) , a key shortcoming of using this measure to compare mobility across different matrices is that it does not distinguish whether differences in mobility are due to: (1) differences in the distribution of occupations across matrices, or (2) differences in the strength of the association of the rows and columns of the matrices. A simple example can illustrate this point. Assume that we would like to compare mobility in countries A and B, and that there are two occupational groups in each of the countries. In country A, 50% of individuals work in occupational category 1 and 50% work in occupational category 2, in both the father's and the son's generation. In country B, 25% of individuals work in occupational category 1 and 75% work in occupational category 2, in both the father's and the son's generation. Assume that in both countries the occupation of a son is independent of the occupation of his father. In this case, the fraction of sons working on a different occupational category than their father would, on average, be 1 2 in country A but only 3 8 in country B. Note, however, that in this hypothetical example there is no association between fathers' and sons' outcomes in either of the countries. 9
To provide a comparison of mobility across the four countries while correcting for differences in their occupational structure, I followed Long and Ferrie (2013) and completed the following steps.
First, for each pair of countries, I computed the Altham (1970) statistic d(P, Q). This statistic measures the difference in the strength of row-column association between the mobility matrices corresponding to countries P and Q. The Altham statistic is based on the relative odds with which individuals with fathers in different occupations find a given a job in adulthood. Under perfect mobility, the relative odds are one: a father's occupation does not provide any advantage in obtaining a given occupation in adulthood. 10 More precisely, given two matrices P and Q of size r × s, the Altham statistic d(P, Q) is given by:
( 1) where p ij is the element ij in matrix P -the fraction of sons whose father is in occupational category i who work in occupational category j-and q ij is defined analogously for matrix Q.
Higher values of d(P, Q) imply larger differences in the row-column association, but are not informative regarding which of the matrices exhibits more mobility. The second step is then to calculate the statistic d(P, J) for each of the countries. This statistic measures the same difference in row-column association but relative to a matrix J representing independence (a matrix of ones).
In the previous example, the odds of children of category 1 workers of landing job 1 instead of job 2, relative to the children of category 2 workers are: 
Higher values of d(P, J) imply greater departures from independence (less mobility).
There are two useful properties of the Altham statistic. First, it is possible to perform a likelihood-ratio test to assess whether the statistic is significantly different from zero. Second, the statistic can be decomposed into the different elements of the sum. Hence, it is possible to assess which precise odd ratios explain most of the differences between the two matrices.
There are, however, two main limitations of this measure. First, the measure does not assume any ordering of the occupational categories. Hence, it is not possible to ascertain whether a given movement across occupational categories represented upgrading or downgrading. Second, the measure treats movements across categories symmetrically regardless of the origin and destination categories, and also regardless of the country that is being considered. In other words, there is no assumed "distance" between the occupational groups. the Argentina-US comparison, suggesting that mobility patterns were the closest among these two countries. Indeed, as can be seen in table 1, the mobility matrices of Argentina and the US are quite similar to each other, suggesting that the similar mobility of the two countries is not driven by the use of the Altham statistic as the measure of mobility. Second, the data suggest that mobility in Argentina was slightly higher than in the US -the distance with respect to independence is higher for the US-but substantially higher than in Britain and Norway. The departure from independence (first column of table 2) is about twice as large in Britain and Norway relative to Argentina and the US. The results also suggest that mobility was similarly low in Britain and Norway. Table 3 shows that these findings are robust to various features of the linking procedure. First, I redo the mobility comparisons using a more conservative linking procedure only for the Argentine and US samples. In this way, I bias the sample towards finding less mobility in Argentina and the US. To do so, I first exclude observations from the Argentine and US samples that are not exact matches in terms of their first and last names. Second, because individuals with common names are more likely to be incorrectly linked, I exclude observations in the top 25% in terms of first name frequency within their province/state of birth, and then observations who are in the top 50%. The top three rows of table 3 show that these exercises result in a very similar pattern to the one that I obtain in the baseline analysis. Yet, it is theoretically possible that the fraction of false positives in the Argentinaand US samples was higher than in the British and Norwegian samples even when using a relatively more conservative sample just for the former two countries. How much larger would the rate of false positives in Argentina and the US need to be to generate the observed differences with respect to Britain and Norway?
The observed mobility matrices are a combination of: (1) the "true" transition matrices (when father-son links are correct) and (2) the "false" transition matrices (when father-son links are incorrect). Assume that the transition matrix among unrelated father-sons is equal to the transition matrix that we would observe under independence (which would be the case if sons were randomly matched to fathers).
Let's call α P the fraction of false positives in the linked sample corresponding to country P .
Under the above assumption, the observed distance with respect to independence -d(P, J)-can be written as:
where P * is the true transition matrix in country P .
To fix ideas, assume we want to compare the mobility levels of Argentina (P ) and Britain (Q).
Further, assume that: (1) the rate of false positives in the British data were zero (α Q = 0) and that (2) the true mobility levels were the same in both countries (which will be true if P * = Q * ).
This exercise hence gives a lower bound on the rate of false positives that we would need in the Argentine data in order to explain the observed differences in mobility. This lower bound is given by α p such that:
where I made use of the assumption that P * = Q * . Note that, if we replace the right hand side with d(H, J), we can use this expression to find the value α H that would rationalize the observed differences in mobility between countries H and Q, under the assumption of no true differences in mobility.
Panel (a) of figure 1 shows the value of d((1−α P )P * +α P J, J) (y-axis) for different values of α P (x-axis), under the assumption that the true mobility matrix of Argentina (or the US) was the same as the true mobility matrix of Britain. In panel (b), I assume instead that the true mobility matrix of Argentina (or the US) was the same as the true mobility matrix of Norway. The intersection between d((1 − α P )P * + α P J, J) and the observed value of d(P, J) hence corresponds to α P , the lower bound in the share of false positives that we would need to ralitonalize the observed mobility differences.
Panel (a) shows that we would need the rate of false positives in the Argentine data to be at least 41% to rationalize the observed differences between Argentina and Britain. Panel (b) shows that, if Argentina and Norway had the same true levels of mobility, we would need the rate of false positives in the Argentine sample to be at least 55%. Similarly, for the US to have the same mobility as Britain we would need the rate of false positives in the British data to be at least 35%, and for the US and Norway to have the same levels we would need this rate to be at least 48%.
While it is not possible to theoretically discard such high levels of false positives in the Argentina and US samples relative to Britain and Norway, It seems unlikely that samples that were generated using similar linking procedures would exhibit such large differences in false positives. 11
The second concern is that the results might be driven by differential selection into linked the sample across countries. Note that this differential selection would be a challenge to my main finding if the linked sample oversampled individuals with higher mobility prospects in Argentina and the US. While there are no strong a priori reasons to expect this pattern, I cannot fully rule out this possibility since I only observe mobility for individuals in the linked sample. Yet, to partially address this concern, in the last row of table 3 I report an estimate of the Altham statistic reweighing the Argentine data to account for selection on observables into the linked sample. 12
Similarly, I present results using the reweighted US and Norwegian samples based on the person 11 it is also possible to compute the lower bound of the rate of false positives in the Argentine data that would rationalize the observed differences with respect to the US, under the assumption of no true differences in mobility. I find that a rate of false positives that is just 6 percentage points higher for Argentina than for the US can rationalize the observed differences.
12 To compute the sample weights, I pooled the 1895 census cross section with the linked sample to estimate a probit model of the probability of being on the matched sample. I included as explanatory variables place of birth fixed effects, occupational category fixed effects, an indicator for literacy, an indicator that takes a value of one if the individual owned real estate property, and an indicator for urban status. I then used the inverse of the linkage probability as weights. Another concern is that, while mobility across occupational categories was higher in Argentina and the US, mobility witihin occupational categories might have been lower, resulting in overall lower mobility. Given the absence of individual-level earnings data, it is not possible to fully assess the extent of economic mobility in each of the countries. However, it is possible to assess how the results change as we consider mobility across less coarse occupational categories. If mobility within occupational categories was higher in Britain and Norway relative to Argentina and the US, then we should observe that the difference between these countries shrinks as we consider mobility across finer categories. and proprietors) and "low white-collar" (clerical and sales). As expected, the departure from independence is higher in all of the matrices. However, the ranking of countries in terms of distance with respect to independence does not change. Similarly, all the differences in mobility across countries remain large and statistically significant.
III Why was Mobility Higher in the US and Argentina than in
Britain and Norway?
The above results suggest that mobility levels were higher in Argentina and the US than in Britain and Norway. In addition, Long and Ferrie (2013) show that mobility differences between the US and Britain had largely disappeared by the second half of the 20th century. Any explanation of these results must then probably be related to features of the economy that distinguished Argentina and the US from Britain and Norway in the late 19th century, but for which such differences did not exist in the second half of the 20th century. I consider eight potential explanations: (1) differences in international immigration and emigration rates, (2) differences in the provision of public schooling, (3) differences in the degree of industrialization, (4) differences in inequality, (5) differences in fertility rates, (6) differences in the extent of internal migration, (7) differences in rates of population growth, and (8) differences in access to land.
A Decomposing Differences in Mobility
As a first step towards understanding the sources of mobility differences, I decompose the Altham statistics corresponding to the Argentina-US, Argentina-Britain and Argentina-Norway comparisons into its different components based on the formula in equation 1. Table 4 shows the results of this decomposition. In each case, I report the ten largest elements of the statistic. In panel also report the corresponding odds ratio in each of the countries.
The main difference between Argentina and Britain corresponds to the odds at which sons of farmers entered farming rather than unskilled work relative to the sons of unskilled workers. In Argentina, the sons of farmers were 2.7 more likely to enter farming relative to unskilled work than the sons of unskilled workers. This same magnitude takes a much larger value (almost 49) for Britain. The second largest component corresponds to the odds at which the children of farmers entered farming rather than unskilled work relative to the children of skilled/semi-skilled workers.
These two odds ratios are also the largest in the US-Britain comparison (Long and Ferrie, 2013) .
Overall, this table is consistent with the main difference between Argentina and Britain being that entering farming was relatively easier for the children of non-farmers in Argentina. I note, however, that because the Altham statistic is based on odd ratios, it is not possible to establish whether these differences are driven by (1) easier access to farming for children of non-farmers or by (2) less attachment to farming among children of farmers.
The main difference of Argentina with respect to Norway stems from the odds at which children of white collar workers entered white collar jobs rather than farming compared to children of unskilled workers. In Argentina, this ratio took a value of approximately 4.7, whereas the value was above 120 for Norway. The second largest difference is the odds at which children of white collar workers entered white collar jobs rather than farming compared to children of farmers. This ratio took a value of about 9 in Argentina and of more than 200 in Norway. This pattern suggests that entering white-collar jobs was relatively easier for the children of non-white collar workers in Argentina than in Norway. Not all of the major components of the Altham statistic comparing Argentina and Norway involve the farming category. For instance, the relative odds at which sons of white collar workers entered white-collar rather than unskilled occupations relative to the children of unskilled workers was 11 in Argentina, but more than 200 in Norway.
Where did the small differences between Argentina and the US stem from? Panel (c) shows the results of the Argentina-US comparison. The results suggest that accessing white-collar jobs was relatively harder in the US for the children of non white-collar workers. In particular, the largest difference between the two countries is the odds at which children of white-collar workers entered white-collar occupations rather than unskilled jobs relative to the children of unskilled workers.
B Economic Sources of Differences in Mobility
Argentina and the US featured a higher fraction of foreign-born individuals in the population.
Immigrant families might exhibit higher rates of intergenerational occupational mobility, if firstgeneration immigrants suffer a penalty in the labor market that is then eroded by the second generation. For instance, Feigenbaum (2017) finds higher intergenerational mobility among the grandchildren of immigrants in early 20th-century Iowa.
To test whether the higher fraction of immigrants in Argentina and the US could explain the higher mobility in these countries, I recompute the Altham statistic excluding the father-son pairs in which the father is an immigrant from the Argentine and the US samples. If the difference between Argentina and the US and Europe was just driven by differences in the fraction of immigrants in the population, we should observe similar mobility levels when excluding foreigners from the analysis. The second row in table 5 shows that a higher fraction of immigrants cannot account for the higher mobility in Argentina and the US. First, excluding immigrants from the sample only leads to a mild decrease in the distance of the mobility matrices of Argentina and the US with respect to independence (first and second rows of columns 1 and 2). Second, the difference with respect to both Britain and Noway remains of similar size and statistically significant for both the US and Argentina (first and second rows of columns 6 to 9).
The other side of the migration story is that both Britain and Norway had a much larger share of emigrants than Argentina and the US. One possible explanation for the differences in mobility would be a sample selection issue: the most mobile Old World sons moved to the New World, resulting in overall less mobility among stayers but perhaps similar mobility overall. It is possible to bound the quantitative importance of this factor. To do so, I assume that the occupation of sons who migrated internationally was independent of the occupation of their fathers -that is, that emigrating sons experienced the maximum possible amount of mobility.
Let's denote H as the transition matrix among British stayers -an analogous reasoning applies for the Norwegian matrix. The element ij in this matrix is the fraction of sons with fathers in occupational category i that worked in occupational category j in adulthood. Let J be a matrix representing the predicted transitions under independence. Note that, under independence, the probability that a son works in a given occupational category in adulthood is the same regardless of parental occupation, and equal to the fraction of sons in a given occupational category. For simplicity, I assume that the occupational distribution of fathers among stayers is equal to the occupational distribution of fathers among emigrants. Under these assumptions, the simulated transition matrix including emigrants and stayers is given by:
where α is the fraction of emigrants in the population. This matrix is a weighted average between the observed transition matrix and the predicted transition matrix under independence.
The third row in table 5 shows the results of comparing the observed mobility matrices of Argentina and the US to the simulated matrices of Britain and Norway, under the assumption of perfect mobility among European emigrants. In the baseline exercise, I assume that the share of sons who emigrated out of Norway was 20% and the share of sons who emigrated out of Britain was 10%. 13 Overall, this exercise suggests that emigration out of Europe cannot fully account for the observed differences. Even under the extreme assumption of perfect mobility among European emigrants, the difference with respect to New World countries remains large and statistically significant. Indeed, for mobility in Britain and Norway to be similar to that in Argentina and the US, the emigration rate would have needed to be above 40% -and all of these individuals be perfectly occupationally mobile -, an implausibly large rate of outmigration. Solon (2004) presents a model in which differences in the provision of public schooling lead to variation in intergenerational mobility across time and place. Can variation in public schools provision explain the difference between the Old and the New World? The answer is most likely no. In the US, 68.1 percent of 5-14 year olds attended primary school in 1850, compared to 49.8 percent in 1851 Britain (Long and Ferrie, 2013) . However, only 16% of individuals in this age range attended school in 1869 Argentina. It is, therefore, unlikely that the higher mobility levels in Argentina and the US were due to more widespread availability of public schools. 14 Another potential explanation is that European countries might have been at a different stage of the industrialization process. When comparing mobility levels in the US and Britain in the 19th-century, Long and Ferrie (2013) argue that selective mobility out of farming could partially account for the difference across the countries. They write:
Consider nineteenth century Britain versus the nineteenth century US: Britain has already seen almost all of its flight from agriculture by 1851 (Figure 2 ), so the sons of farmer fathers are already selected for remaining in farming (all the sons who were more loosely attached to the sector have already left by 1851. At the same time, the sons of non-farm fathers are already selected for remaining outside farming (all the sons eager to enter farming have already done so). In the US, this weeding out process has not taken place in the nineteenth century, so the US has more mobility both out of and into farming that gets added onto whatever the underlying amount of mobility would be otherwise.
Indeed, in a comment article to Long and Ferrie (2013) , Xie and Killewald (2013) argue that the smaller size of the farming sector in Britain in the 1850s can largely explain the finding of higher mobility in the US at the time. Table 1 shows that the most salient difference across countries in terms of occupational structure is the much lower proportion of fathers employed in farming in Britain relative to the three other countries. However, this proportion is similar in Norway (58%), Argentina (47%) and the US (59%).
Moreover, the decline in farming employment from the father's to the son's generation was also of similar size in each of these three countries.
If the only reason why mobility was higher in Argentina and the US than in Europe were 14 The cohorts of children included in the analysis were in school age before the large scale expansion of public schooling in Argentina in the second half of the 19th century. differences in the size of the farming sector, then we should not observe differences when comparing Argentina and the US to Norway, a country with a similar proportion of the workforce in farming.
Yet, I find that the differences in mobility with respect to Norway are similar in magnitude than those with respect to Britain. Moreover, Britain and Norway look similar to each other with respect to mobility, despite vast differences in the size of the farming sector. Hence, this pattern suggests that differences in the initial size of the farming sector are not the only explanation for these mobility differences.
I next consider whether differences in inequality across countries could account for the differences in mobility rates. In other words, was the difference in mobility rates across the Old and the New World a reflection of the "Great Gatsby" curve? 15 For this to be the case, we would need both Argentina and the US to have had lower inequality than Britain and Norway in the second half of the 19th-century.
I am not aware of any research comparing these four countries with respect to late 19th-century inequality. However, the scattered available evidence does not appear consistent with a simple inequality story. First, Lindert and Williamson (2016) document similar levels of inequality in the US and Britain in this time period. Second, Williamson (2015) documents similar levels of income inequality in Latin America -although the analysis does not include Argentina -than in the rest of the Western world in the period.
One important change that was taking place in the mid 19th-century was the fertility transition.
If fertility rates were lower in Europe, then each family could allocate its resources among fewer offspring, perhaps facilitating the transmission of economic status across generations. Indeed, Britain was at the forefront of the fertility transition at this period (Guinnane, 2011) .
Can lower fertility rates explain why mobility was lower in Europe? To test this possibility, I recomputed the Altham statistics focusing on a sample of Argentine and US households with relatively low fertility rates. To do so, I divided households in Argentina and the US into those with above and below median fertility, based on the number of siblings in the household. Because families in which the father was younger will mechanically have fewer children due to incomplete fertility, I focus on the sample of households in which fathers are at least 40 years old in the baseline year. In the last row of table 5, I compare mobility in the sample of below median fertility New World families, to mobility in the full sample of Old World families. While the estimates from this sample indicate lower mobility in Argentina and the US, the magnitude of the difference with respect to the baseline level is small. Moreover, the difference of Argentina and the US with respect to Britain and Norway remains of similar size and statistically significant.
An important similarity between Argentina and the US at the time is that both countries were characterized by high levels of internal geographic mobility. These opportunities to migrate internally might have enabled families in Argentina and the US to improve the life chances of their children. In Argentina, 53% of the sons in the linked sample had moved to a different department (the equivalent of US counties) by 1895. In the US, the fraction of sons who switched counties from 1850 to 1880 period was 64% (Long and Ferrie, 2013) .
In Britain, the fraction of sons changing their county of residence was only 27%. However, the fraction of sons living in a different location than their father was also very high in Norway, and of similar magnitude to that in Argentina and the US: about half of the Norwegian sons moved to a different municipality in the 1865 to 1900 period. This evidence suggests that an explanation based on greater residential mobility per se is unlikely to fully account for the differences between Argentina and the US and Europe.
One unique characteristic of internal migrations in Argentina and the US were the movements towards the "frontier". These movements were, however, infrequent in both countries in the second half of the 19th century. Among the sons in the 1869 Argentine census, just about 10% resided in the "frontier" by 1895, where the frontier is defined as any of the 1895 locations that were excluded from the 1869 census. The fraction of sons moving to the "frontier" was similarly low in the US (Long and Ferrie, 2013) . Hence, migration to the frontier likely comes short of explaining the higher mobility in Argentina and the US.
So, what made Argentina and the US more mobile countries in the late 19th century? I argue that the differences between Argentina and the US and Britain and Norway stemmed from two main sources. First, both Argentina and the US more than doubled their population in the period under consideration. From 1850 to 1880, the US increased its population from around 23 to close to 50 millions. From 1869 to 1895, the population of Argentina went from 2 to 4 million. In contrast, British population went from 27 to just 34 million over a 30 years period. Similarly, the population of Norway went from around 1.7 to 2.2 million from 1865 to 1900.
These large increases in population in Argentina and the US were accompanied by the fast expansion of cities and towns, including the creation of some new ones. Two prominent examples of this phenomenon are the cities of Rosario, in Argentina, and Chicago, in the US. Rosario went from having only 23,000 inhabitants in 1869 to 92,000 in 1895. Chicago's population increased by a factor of ten from 1859 to 1870. These are not the only two examples. By 1869, there were 56 towns with 2,000 or more persons in Argentina. By 1895, this number was close to 100 (de la Fuente, 1898) . This large expansion included the growth of small urban centers in the province of Buenos Aires, but it was not just confined to the Littoral region: there was a dramatic growth in the size of some cities and towns in the interior of the country as well.
Why would a rapid expansion of the population create opportunities for occupational mobility?
To illustrate this point, consider the following stylized model. There are 2 occupations and 2 time periods. There are N fathers, and each of them has just one children. In each period, there is a fraction α of workers employed in occupation 1. Assume we start from a situation perfect immobility in which all of the children of workers in occupation 1 work in occupation 1 (and all the children of workers in occupation 2 work in occupation 2.) Hence, the chances of children of workers in occupation 1 to work in occupation 1 rather than occupation 2 are infinitely larger than the corresponding chances for children of workers in occupation 2. Now, consider the effects of an expansion of population happening in between periods 1 and 2, so that total population goes from N to N * . Further, assume that the occupational structure -that is, the fraction α of workers in each occupation-stays the same as in the case with no population change. In the case of Argentina and the US, this expansion in population corresponds to the inflow of European immigrants. In this scenario, the number of available jobs in occupation 1 in period 2 would be equal to N * × α. Hence, if some of these additional jobs in occupation 1 are filled by the children of workers in occupation 2, then the odd ratios would go down. relative to the scenario with no population change.
Second, the higher availability of unexploited land In both Argentina and the US made it easier -relative to Britain and Norway-for the children of non-farmers to enter independent farming. This explanation is consistent with the results on the previous subsection, that suggest an important role for differences in the likelihood of entering independent farming for children of non-farmers.
IV Conclusion
I compared rates of intergenerational occupational mobility across four countries in the late 19th-century: Argentina, the US, Britain and Norway. To the best of my knowledge, this paper constitutes the first comparison of 19th-century social mobility using consistent data and methodology to include a Latin American or currently developing country.
The results indicate that Argentina and the US had higher intergenerational mobility than Britain and Norway. In interpreting these results, I argue that the common character of Argentina and US as "settler economies" can explain their higher rates of mobility relative to Europe.
Overall, the evidence suggests that social mobility was exceptionally high in some areas of recent European settlement in the late 19th-century. With this observation in mind, the decline in social mobility that followed in the course of the 20th-century (Long and Ferrie, 2013; Feigenbaum, 2017; Parman, 2011) seems perhaps unavoidable.
The high levels of social mobility in late 19th-century Argentina also posit a historical and theoretical puzzle. Benabou and Ok (2001) and Piketty (1995) argue that high level of mobility would tend to dampen demands for income redistribution. Indeed, the ethos of the American Dream has been used to rationalize why the US engages in less redistribution than other developed countries (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) . So, why did Argentina, despite featuring high levels of mobility in the 19th-century, end up engaging in much higher levels of redistribution than the US over the course of the 20th-century? Notes: This figure shows the rate of false positives that would be needed to eliminate the observed differences in mobility between Argentina and the US and Britain and Norway, under the assumptions that: (1) the rate of false positives is zero for both Britain and Norway and (2) the true differences in mobility between Argentina and the US and Britain and Norway were zero. See main text for further details. Larger values of the statistic correspond to larger differences in the row-column association of the matrices. Larger differences with respect to independence represent lower mobility. For each of these distances, I performed a test of the hypothesis that d(i, j) = 0. Significance levels are indicated by * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Linking Algorithms
Argentina. For each pair of potential matches, I computed a linking score measuring the similarity between the records. To do so, I first obtained information on the similarity of first and last names (based on the Jaro-Winkler string distance measure), and predicted year of birth (based on reported age). Next, I aggregated these distances into a single score using the EM algorithm (Winkler, 1988) . Finally, I used the linking score to decide which records to incorporate to the analysis. To be incorporated to the analysis, a record had to satisfy three conditions: (1) be the record with the highest linking score among all the potential matches for that individual, (2) have a linking score above a minimum threshold (p 1 > p), and (3) have a linking score sufficiently higher than the second-best linking score (
Britain. The online appendix in Long and Ferrie (2013) describes the linking algorithm used to create the British sample. For Britain, to be considered a match for an individual from 1851, an individual from 1881 had to have the same standardized name (using the SOUNDEX algorithm), a year of birth different by no more than five years, and the same county and parish of birth.
US and Norway. The strategy used to create the US and Norway samples is described in detail in the North Atlantic Population Project (Ruggles et al., 2011) website. Similar to the approach used in Pérez (2017) , each pair of potential pairs was assigned a linking score based on the similarity between names and estimated years of birth. After computing the similarity scores, they manually classified a subset of observations as true or false matches. Finally, they used the similarity scores in combination with the manually classified matches in a machine learning procedure. In both cases, I focus exclusively on primary links, for which the linking process was based just on names, place of birth and year of birth. 
